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Abstract
After a neutral technology shock, hours worked decline in a persistent manner in the
UK. This response is robust to a variety of considerations in the recent literature: mea-
sures of labour input, level versus di®erenced hours in the VAR, small and large VARS,
long- versus medium-run identi¯cation, and neutral versus investment-speci¯c technol-
ogy shocks. The UK economy, therefore, o®ers a unique perspective on the response of
hours to technology shocks. The large negative correlation between labour productiv-
ity and hours is the source of this response. Models with nominal price stickiness, low
substitutability between domestic and foreign consumption, and investment-speci¯c
shocks appear to be most plausible in interpreting the short-run e®ects of technol-
ogy shocks. Quantitatively, however, technology shocks account for under 20% of the
business cycle variation in hours and under 30% of business cycle variation in output.
These ¯ndings suggest that technology shocks may play only a limited role in driving
UK business cycles.
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A central feature of economic °uctuations is the positive co-movement of economic activity and
labour input measures. Real business cycle (RBC) theory, developed following the contribution of
Kydland and Prescott (1982), emphasizes shocks to technology as drivers of economic °uctuations,
and predicts an increase in output and hours-worked after positive technology shocks. Gal¶ ³ (1999),
however, has shown that positive technology shocks, identi¯ed as permanent shocks to labour pro-
ductivity via long-run restrictions in a structural vector-autoregression (SVAR), lead to a decline
in hours worked in the post World War II US data. Similarly, Basu et al. (2005), using an aug-
mented growth accounting approach to identify technology shocks, ¯nd that hours decline after
technology improvements.1 These ¯ndings suggest that technology shocks are not a major source
of economic °uctuations and, consequently, do not support the RBC view of business cycles. More-
over, models with nominal price stickiness generate a decline in hours if monetary policy does not
fully accommodate the technology shock, and therefore, are consistent with the empirical evidence.
A large body of recent literature has reinforced or debated these conclusions, and their impli-
cations for evaluating business cycle theories, from a variety of standpoints.2 In particular, issues
include whether identi¯ed shocks represent variations in technology (Francis and Ramey (2004));
the treatment of hours in the SVAR (Christiano et al. (2003)); small-sample biases and weak-
ness of long-run restrictions in identifying technology shocks when non-technology shocks can also
have permanent e®ects on labour productivity (Faust and Leeper (1997), Uhlig (2004), Erceg et al.
(2005), Christiano et al. (2005)); low-frequency correlation between hours and productivity (Fernald
(2005)); and the role of investment-speci¯c versus neutral technology shocks (Fisher (2005)).
In this paper we examine the response of hours to identi¯ed technology shocks in the UK and
assess the plausibility of alternative models in accounting for that response. We then quantify the
importance of technology shocks in driving UK business cycles. In doing so, we pay close attention
to the important considerations mentioned above. Our analysis can, therefore, provide a useful
perspective on the generality of the issues raised in the recent US literature.
We consider two measures of output and labour input (hours and employment), namely, whole
1Shea (1998) identi¯es shocks to R&D and patent applications as more direct measures of stochastic
variations in technology. He ¯nds that technology shocks increase short-run labour input and reduce it in
the long run.
2See Gal¶ ³ and Rabanal (2004) for a detailed discussion and overview of the literature.
1economy and private sector measures. The sample period is 1971 Q1 - 2004 Q4 for whole economy
measures, and 1987 Q1 - 2004 Q4 for private sector measures. In addition, we use data on other
macroeconomic variables described in the later sections.
To identify technology shocks, we consider two types of restrictions. First, the long-run re-
striction requiring that unit root in labour productivity is exclusively driven by technology shocks.
Following Gal¶ ³ (1999), this restriction is extensively used in the literature. Second, the medium-
run restriction, proposed by Uhlig (2004), which identi¯es the most persistent shock to labour
productivity over a three to ten year horizon without imposing a unit root. This identi¯cation
scheme is motivated by the concern that shocks other than technology (eg. capital income tax) can
also have a permanent e®ect on labour productivity invalidating the identifying assumption under
long-run restrictions. Using simulated data from dynamic general equilibrium model, Uhlig (2004)
shows that medium-run restrictions are more robust relative to long-run restrictions in identifying
technology shocks. Another concern with long-run restrictions, as Faust and Leeper (1997) show,
is that the di®erence between a very persistent and a unit root process in ¯nite data may not be
pronounced leading to less reliable identi¯cation.
We begin by considering a bivariate-SVAR framework in labour productivity growth and total
hours (in ¯rst-di®erences) as in Gal¶ ³ (1999). We ¯nd that after a positive technology shock, hours
decline in a persistent manner in the UK. The response of hours does not change if hours are
speci¯ed in levels in the VAR. The ¯nding that hours decline under both di®erence- and level-
speci¯cations for the UK is in sharp contrast to the ¯ndings of Christiano et al. (2003) for the
US data. They ¯nd that in the level-speci¯cation, hours rise after a positive technology shock,
consistent with the prediction of an RBC model. Relative to the debate in the US literature,
therefore, the level- versus di®erence-speci¯cation of hours appears to be unimportant for the UK.
Following the recommendations of Erceg et al. (2005) and Christiano et al. (2005), we consider
larger VAR systems to minimize the potential small-sample biases associated with long-run identi¯-
cation. We also use the alternative medium-run restriction, without imposing a unit root in labour
productivity. The response of hours in these larger VAR systems and under both identi¯cations
schemes is the same, that is, they decline after a positive technology shock.
What drives the hours response in the UK? To answer this question, we present an analytical
discussion similar to that in Fernald (2005), based on the Shapiro and Watson (1988) methodology
2to impose long-run restrictions. In the level-speci¯cation, the response of hours to technology
shocks is driven largely by the negative covariances of labour productivity growth with current and
lagged hours in the data. By contrast, Fernald (2005) ¯nds that both covariances in the US data
are positive, leading to a positive response of hours to technology shocks when hours are in levels.
Similarly, in the di®erence-speci¯cation, the negative covariances that drive the response of hours
are between labour productivity growth, and the current and lagged growth rate of hours. The
large negative correlation between labour productivity and hours (-0.40 for HP ¯ltered data and
-0.27 for growth rates) are consistent with these negative covariances.
Next, using the methodology of Fisher (2005), we identify both neutral (N) and investment-
speci¯c (I) technology shocks , and examine their e®ects on hours, output, investment, and pro-
ductivity. For neutral shocks, the e®ects are the same as when these shocks alone are identi¯ed.
By contrast, both hours and output rise in response to I-shocks. This positive co-movement is con-
sistent with the contemporaneous correlations in the data, and also consistent with the theoretical
prediction of a model with such shocks. Investment also surges in response to this shock, whereas it
is muted in response to an N-shock. Productivity, however, declines in a persistent manner whereas
the model predicts that it recovers after an initial decline. We ¯nd the responses to I-shocks to be
sensitive across small and large VARs, and also to a mean break in the nominal investment-output
ratio. Interestingly, as it turns out, both the recommendations of Erceg et al. (2005) and Christiano
et al. (2005) to include nominal consumption-to-output and nominal investment-to-output ratios in
the VARs to eliminate small-sample biases, and the recommendation of Fernald (2005) to allow for
breaks appear to be important in the context of examining the implications of estimated I-shocks
for the UK.
Based on the pattern of impulse responses, our ¯ndings suggest that three classes of models
may be most plausible in interpreting the short-run e®ects of technology shocks in the UK. First,
the models with nominal price stickiness as pointed out in Gal¶ ³ (1999). Second, the augmented
RBC model which generate a decline in labour input in response to technology shocks via strong
wealth e®ects. Within this class, Francis and Ramey (2004) consider a °exible price model with real
rigidities such as habit-formation and capital adjustment costs to rationalize the decline in hours.
Given the persistent decline in hours worked in the UK, it is, however, di±cult to gauge whether
real frictions of this sort are particularly strong in the UK economy. Groth (2005), for example,
3¯nds that estimated capital adjustment costs in the UK are broadly similar to the estimates for the
US. An alternative possibility in this class, as suggested by Collard and Dellas (2004), is an open-
economy RBC model with low elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign consumption.
Empirical evidence in Hooper et al. (2005) indicates that this elasticity for the UK is indeed small.
The Collard and Dellas (2004) model, therefore, appears to be relevant in the UK context. Third,
models that emphasize investment-speci¯c relative to neutral technology shocks, as in Greenwood
et al. (2000) and Fisher (2005), to interpret the co-movement of hours and output, and the response
of investment.
We conduct a quantitative analysis to determine the role of technology shocks in driving UK
business cycles. In terms of forecast error variance decompositions, we ¯nd that the I-shocks
contribute more to the forecast error variance of hours than the N-shocks over horizons of four to
twenty quarters. N-shocks contribute relatively more to the forecast error variance of output over
the same horizons. The contributions of such shocks over these horizons, however, remain less than
30%. Comparing it with the results in Fisher (2005) for the US, we ¯nd that in quantitative terms
the percent contributions of both shocks are smaller at these horizons.
Turning to business cycle e®ects, the relative cyclical variances of hours and output accounted
for by N-shocks in the UK are small and similar in magnitude as those in the US data, as in Gal¶ ³
(1999) and Christiano et al. (2003). The cyclical variances accounted for by I-shocks are, however,
substantially smaller compared to those in Fisher (2005). Quantitatively, technology shocks account
for under 20% of the business cycle variation in hours and under 30% of business cycle variation in
output. These ¯ndings suggest that technology shocks may play only a limited role in driving UK
business cycles.
Finally, we conduct several robustness checks and provide corroborative evidence to establish
that the permanent shocks to labour productivity in the UK data, identi¯ed as technology shocks,
are indeed capturing variations in technology.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data, some key correlations,
and the identi¯cation methodology. Section 3 presents the results and plausibility of alternative
models. In Section 4 we examine the business cycle implications. Section 5 presents robustness
analysis. Section 6 concludes.
42 Data and identi¯cation
In this section we describe the UK data and some key business cycle correlations. We then discuss
the methodology for identifying technology shocks.
2.1 Data
We consider two measures of output and labour input, namely, whole economy and private sector
measures. The variables are in logs and the data period is 1971 Q1 - 2004 Q4 for whole economy
measures, and 1987 Q1 - 2004 Q4 for private sector measures.3 Figure 1 displays the whole economy
labour input measures (hours and employment measures). Figure 2 displays labour productivity
growth, hours per capita (16-64 years), in°ation, real interest rate, nominal investment-to-output
ratio, and nominal consumption-to-output ratio, variables we use in our empirical analysis.
2.2 Contemporaneous correlations
Table 1 documents key business cycle contemporaneous correlations of cyclical and growth rates
in output, two measures of labour input (employment and total hours), and labour productivity
(de¯ned as either output per worker or output per hour) for both whole economy and private sector
data.4 Several notable aspects emerge from Table 1. For the HP ¯ltered data, the output-hours
correlation is large and positive, indicating the strong positive co-movement which typically char-
acterizes business cycles. Similarly, the output-employment correlation is also large and positive.
In terms of growth rates, the correlation is somewhat higher for the private sector measures. The
output-labour productivity correlations are positive for the HP ¯ltered data implying procyclical
labour productivity. For the private sector measure, however, the correlation between cyclical
output (using the HP ¯lter) and labour productivity per hour is negative.
Most notably, the correlation between labour productivity and hours or employment (in bold)
is large and negative. The correlations for whole economy measure range from -0.09 to -0.40.
The correlations for private sector measure are even lower, ranging from -0.30 to -0.60. By way
3The private sector is de¯ned as whole economy minus public administration, minus health and education
sectors.
4Early paper by Blackburn and Ravn (1992) document the properties of UK business cycles (over 1956-
1990) and compared it with the US. They note that cyclical variations in labour at the intensive margin
(hours per worker) and the extensive margin (employment) are similar, but less pronounced relative to the
US. In the US, roughly three-quarters of cyclical variation in total hours is accounted for by variations in
employment.
5of contrast, in the US data the correlation between business sector productivity and hours over
the period 1971 Q1 to 2004 Q4 is zero.5 As stressed by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), the
standard technology shock driven RBC model implies a large and positive correlation between
labour productivity and hours. That model, by overstating the observed correlations, therefore,
fails to account for this feature of the US data. They suggest augmenting the standard RBC
model to include demand shocks (in particular government spending shocks) can help lower the
implied theoretical correlations and thereby help improve the prediction of the model along this
dimension. Similarly, in the case of UK, even larger negative unconditional correlations between
labour productivity and hours relative to the US, in both the whole economy and the private sector
data, clearly pose a strong challenge to the technology shock driven view of cyclical °uctuations.
We discuss this aspect further in Section 4.
2.3 Identi¯cation of technology shocks
We consider two methodologies for identifying technology shocks: long-run and medium-run restric-
tions used in structural VAR (SVAR) literature. We provide a brief discussion of both methodolo-
gies.6
2.3.1 Long-run identi¯cation
Consider a moving average representation of a structural model
yt = ©(L)²t (2.1)
where yt = [¢lpt ht zt]0 and ²t = [²T
t ²t]0. ¢lpt is labour productivity growth, ht is hours (either
di®erenced, in levels, or quadratic detrended), zt is an kX1 vector of additional variables. ²T
t
and ²t are technology and non-technology shocks, respectively. The dimension of ²t is (k + 1)X1.
The variance-covariance matrix E²t²0
t = I (normalized to an identity matrix). ©(L) is a matrix
polynomial in the lag operator L.
5Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992) document a correlation of -0.20 for U.S. data for the period 1955 Q4
to 1983 Q4. Similarly, Uhlig (2004) reports employment-productivity correlations close to zero (0.04 for HP
¯ltered data and -0.05 for growth rates) in the US historical data of Francis and Ramey (2002).
6The methodology of Shapiro and Watson (1988) provides an alternative way to implement long-run
restrictions. Detailed expositions are given, for example, in Blanchard and Quah (1989), King et al. (1991),
and Gal¶ ³ (1999).
6Consider the reduced form vector-autoregression (VAR) representation of the structural model
yt = A(L)yt¡1 + ut; Etutu0
t = § (2.2)
A(L) is a matrix lag polynomial, ¢ = 1¡L, and § is the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals.
The residuals are linearly related to the structural (or fundamental) shocks as
ut = G²t; GG0 = § (2.3)
Using (2.3), the long-run e®ects in (2.2) are given as







A²t = ©(1)G²t (2.4)
We estimate the elements of matrix G to compute the dynamic responses of variables in vector
yt. In the bi-variate VAR case, for example, the restriction GG0 = § gives three equations in
four unknown elements of G. The fourth equation comes from the restriction that non-technology
shock has no long-run e®ect on productivity, implies that the (1;2) element of ©(1)G matrix is
zero. We estimate (2.2) and compute A(1). We compute the lower triangular Choleski matrix, C,
such that CC0 = ©(1)§©(1)0. Since ©(1)G is a factor of ©(1)¡1§©(1)¡10
, we can use the equation
G = ©(1)¡1C. With estimates of the elements in G in hand, we can compute the impulse responses
and the decompositions labour productivity and hours due to the two shocks.
2.3.2 Medium-run identi¯cation
The long-run identi¯cation described above is extensively used in the literature. It obtains a shock
that explains the variance of the forecast error revision in productivity in the long-run (theoretically
this is in¯nite horizon). In ¯nite samples, however, the long-run identi¯cation of shocks may be less
reliable as discussed in Faust and Leeper (1997). One di±culty is that in ¯nite data the di®erence
between a very persistent and a unit root process may not be pronounced.7 Alternatively, as argued
by Uhlig (2004), shocks other than technology (eg. capital income taxation, labour supply) may
have a persistent e®ect on labour productivity and technology shocks alone cannot explain the
forecast error revision variance of labour productivity in any horizon.
7Long run identi¯cation implies very weak restrictions on ©(L) and transfers the uncertainty of a VAR
estimate of ©(1) in all horizons via equation (2.4). Finite restrictions in e®ect alleviate this problem by
imposing some more structure on ©(L), for e.g. that the e®ect of shock i is zero at horizon k.
7Uhlig (2004) proposes medium run restrictions as a means of identifying most persistent shock
to labour productivity over a three to ten year horizon (the medium run) without imposing a unit
root (as in Gal¶ ³ (1999)). Using simulated data, he demonstrates that medium run identi¯cation is
more robust relative to long run identi¯cation even in the case where there are multiple shocks. For
standard parameterizations of his model, the medium run restriction better identi¯es the technology
shock which contributes most to the productivity forecast error revision variance over the medium
run. In this manner it overcomes the critique that long run identi¯cation may be fragile in small
samples.8 We, therefore, consider medium run identi¯cation in addition to long run identi¯cation
to identify technology shocks. Practical implementation of identi¯cation scheme is similar to (2.4)









when labour productivity is in ¯rst-di®erence or
yt = ©kG²t (2.6)
when we identify persistent but not permanent shocks to labour productivity, and where k =
f3;4;:::;10g years depending upon the assumed duration of the medium run.
3 Results
Using the two identi¯cation schemes, we present responses of variables to estimated technology
and non-technology shocks in the UK. We focus, in particular, on the response of hours in light of
several important considerations discussed and debated in the recent literature.
3.1 Level versus ¯rst-di®erence hours
Gal¶ ³ (1999), using the long-run restriction with hours in ¯rst di®erences, ¯nds that hours fall after
a positive technology shock. This estimated response in the US data is opposite to the prediction
of a standard RBC model that hours should rise after a positive technology shock. Christiano et al.
(2003)), however, have argued that hours per capita are stationary and should enter the VAR in
8Francis, Owyang and Theodorou (2005) propose a similar identi¯cation where the unit root in labour
productivity is not imposed. In their procedure, the ¯nite horizon corresponds to one which has a maximum
forecast error variance for productivity.
8levels and not ¯rst-di®erences. They ¯nd that hours rise after a technology shock when hours per
capita enter the VAR in levels.9
3.1.1 Unit root and stationarity tests
We conduct unit root and stationarity tests and examine the time series properties of the data used
in the econometric analysis. Table 2 presents evidence on the presence of a unit root in labour
productivity based on a ADF and KPSS tests, and results from the stationarity tests for hours per
capita, total hours, and employment.10
The ADF tests for labour productivity indicate that the null of a unit root cannot be rejected
in the level of the series, but reject the same null when applied to the ¯rst di®erences at the 1%
level or above (not shown in Table 2). On the other hand the results for the various labour input
measures give a mixed picture. In the case of whole economy per capita hours, the ADF test cannot
reject the null of a unit root at the 10% level. The KPSS test rejects the null of stationarity at
the 10% level. For the private sector measure of hours per capita, however, both tests point to
stationarity of the level series, giving a consistent answer concerning the stationarity of the series.
For total hours, the ADF test rejects the null of a unit root and the KPSS test does not reject the
null of stationarity, although in the latter case the test statistic is very close to the 10% critical
value.
We choose total hours as our preferred measure of labour input since both ADF and KPSS tests
indicate stationarity (Table 1), whereas for per capita hours the results are inconclusive.11 However,
we consider VAR speci¯cations where hours enter either in di®erences (implying non-stationarity)
or in levels (implying stationarity) in light of the important debate in the literature summarized
above. All the results in this section are qualitatively the same when `per capita hours' are used
instead.
9See Gal¶ ³ (2005), for a detailed discussion of non-stationarity of hours. Whelan (2004) ¯nds that the
stochastic trend speci¯cation considered in Gal¶ ³ (1999) is robust to a variety of data transformations, other
issues concerning VAR speci¯cations.
10While low power of unit root tests is well known, long-run identi¯cation of permanent technology shocks
hinges critically on the presence of a unit root in labour productivity.
11Labour productivity is invariant to the choice of total or per capita hours. In the literature it is common
to use per capita hours since this measure relates directly to the theoretical hours worked variable in an
RBC model.
93.1.2 Technology shocks
The VAR contains labour productivity growth ¢lpt and ¯rst di®erence of `total hours' (referred as
`hours') with two lags.12 Figure 3 displays the estimated responses to a positive technology shock
for the whole-economy data, along with bootstrapped error bands.13 Hours worked fall on impact.
This response is statistically signi¯cant and very persistent. Figure 4 shows the impulse responses
for the private sector data. The response of hours is similar to that for the whole-economy data;
hours fall in a persistent manner.
Turning to the estimated response of output, in both whole-economy and private-sector data,
the response is not statistically signi¯cant. Point estimates, however, indicate that output de-
creases in a persistent manner. In the whole-economy data the persistent decline occurs after an
initial increase which lasts for two quarters. Gal¶ ³ (2005) documents a similar persistent decline in
output, although statistically signi¯cant, using annual UK data for the period 1970-2003.14 The
unconditional contemporaneous correlations between labour productivity growth and hours growth
in annual and private sector data sheds light on the similarity of output responses in Figure 4 and
those in Gal¶ ³ (2005). The correlations are approximately the same, -0.56 in the annual data and
-0.59 in the private-sector data. Although the persistent negative output response is puzzling, we
¯nd that it is not robust as discussed below.
Figures 5 and 6 present the responses when hours enter the VAR in level (with four lags) for
the whole-economy and private-sector data, respectively. We ¯nd that hours fall persistently for
approximately ten quarters. The drop is statistically signi¯cant. This ¯nding for the UK data
is in sharp contrast to what one obtains for the US data. We conclude that in the UK data
the estimated responses of hours to technology shock are similar when hours enter the VAR in
di®erences (as in Gal¶ ³ (1999)) or in levels (as in Christiano et al. (2003)). In both cases hours fall
after a technology shock. Relative to the debate in the U.S. literature, therefore, the level- versus
di®erence-speci¯cation of hours appears to be unimportant for the UK. Note that when hours
enter the VAR in levels, the estimated response of output is positive and statistically signi¯cant.
12We used the standard Akaike Information Criterion and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion to test for lag
lengths. We have decided to implement a lag length equal to maxfAIC;SCg.
13The bootstrapped standard error bands are computed from a 1000 draws from the distribution of esti-
mated residuals with replacement. For each draw we estimate the model given pre-sample values from the
data and recover the impulse responses. The standard error bands are the 95th and 5th quantiles from the
distribution of impulse responses.
14That data are constructed by the OECD and part of the their Labour Force Statistics.
10Interestingly, the level speci¯cation for hours in the VAR reverses the sign of the output response.
Recently, Fernald (2005) has showed that once trend breaks in US productivity (which occurred
in early 1970s, when productivity declined, and after mid-1990s, when productivity accelerated) are
accounted for then hours decline after a technology shock even when they enter the VAR in levels.15
When these, statistically and economically plausible, trend breaks are not accounted for then hours
rise as in Christiano et al. (2003). Since in the UK both the level and di®erence speci¯cation of
hours yield the same response of hours to technology shocks, the potential low frequency correlation
between productivity and hours appear to be less important over the sample period. Moreover,
we do not detect a break in UK labour productivity in the sample. We interpret our results to
be consistent with Fernald (2005) as he ¯nds that in sub-samples (periods with no productivity
breaks), hours (in levels) fall after a technology shock in the US data.
3.1.3 Non-technology shocks
Figures 3 to 6 also display the estimated responses to a non-technology shock. While the e®ect on
productivity is temporary (due to the identi¯cation assumption), both hours and output rise in a
persistent manner. The non-technology shock generates a positive comovement between produc-
tivity and hours similar to that found in Gal¶ ³ (1999). Table 4A reports the conditional correlations
between labour productivity and the di®erent labour input measures based on the bi-variate VAR
speci¯cation. Notice that the conditional correlations between non-technology shocks and the
labour input measures are positive. This positive sign implies that for the UK, an augmented
RBC model with multiple shocks (eg. technology and government spending shocks) may not help
lower the implied correlation between productivity and hours to match the data as suggested by
Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992).
3.2 Larger VAR systems and medium-run identi¯cation
In this section we focus on technology shocks identi¯ed from larger VAR systems with additional
macroeconomic variables.16 The ¯ndings of Erceg et al. (2005) based on simulated data suggest
15Gambetti (2005) develops a time-varying coe±cients Bayesian vector autoregression methodology and
¯nds that under both level and ¯rst-di®erence speci¯cations, hours fall in response to a positive technology
shock in the U.S. data. This ¯nding is consistent with those of Fernald (2005), and appears to be an
alternative way of accounting for the e®ects of low frequency correlation between labour productivity growth
and hours in the U.S..
16We identify only the technology shock and not other sources of °uctuations, for example, monetary
shocks, as in Altig et al. (2004).
11that a larger VAR with nominal consumption-output and nominal investment-output ratios helps
minimize the small-sample biases in hours response RBC model documented in Chari et al. (2005).
Christiano et al. (2005) also recommend including these ratios to eliminate small sample bias. More
generally, Erceg et al. (2005) show that such low-ordered VARs (with four lags) provide a close
approximation to the true data generating processes that are based on di®erent parameterizations
of the DSGE models.
We examine the responses from two larger VAR systems. First, a four-variable VAR system
that includes logs of labour productivity, hours, nominal consumption-output ratio, and nominal
investment-output ratio.17 We specify hours in levels and do not impose a unit root on labour
productivity. We use the medium-run restriction with a 40-quarter horizon to identify technology
shocks.18 As discussed in Section 2, medium-run restriction addresses the criticisms of using long-
run restrictions. Figure 7 shows the responses to technology shocks for this VAR system. Second,
a six-variable VAR which, in addition to the above variables, includes in°ation and real interest
rates. In°ation is de¯ned as the annualized rate computed from the GDP de°ator, and the real
interest rate (ex-post) computed as the di®erence between the repo rate and the above measure of
in°ation. Both the real interest rate and the in°ation rate enter with a quadratic trend removed.
Figure 8 shows the responses to technology shocks for this six-variable VAR.19
In both VAR systems, hours fall for three to ¯ve quarters after a positive technology shock. This
response is statistically signi¯cant and consistent with response from the bi-variate VAR discussed
above.20 Output and consumption rise and the responses are statistically signi¯cant. Investment,
however, does not appear to respond much to the positive technology shock.
17These are ratios of nominal personal consumption expenditures to nominal GDP and nominal business
investment to nominal GDP, i.e. the consumption and investment shares of output. In addition we remove
a linear trend from the consumption share.
18Results from alternative de¯nitions of `medium run' ranging between 8 and 20 quarters are very similar.
We also considered the di®erence speci¯cation and sensitivity to lags in the VAR but do not report due
to space limitations. The responses of labour input measures are qualitatively similar. These results are
available upon request.
19Francis, Owyang and Theodorou (2005) extend the analysis of Gal¶ ³ et al. (2003), and examine the
endogenous response of monetary policy in a G-7 context. They consider the employment index as the
labour input measure for the UK in their analysis.
20We also considered speci¯cations with di®erent treatment of the low frequency components of these
variables, e.g. levels or di®erence hours speci¯cation, medium or long run restrictions, deterministic trends
etc. In all the experiments, the labour input response to the technology shock is the same, it declines in
response to a positive technology shock. More discussion on the low frequency considerations follows in
section 5.
123.3 What drives the hours response in the UK?
The previous sections established a robust ¯nding that hours in the UK decline after a technology
shock. In this section we follow a very useful analytical discussion in Fernald (2005) to explain
the response of hours, based on the Shapiro and Watson (1988) methodology to impose long-run
restrictions. This methodology is an equivalent way of identifying technology shocks as compared
to the approach discussed in Section 2.3.1. It involves estimating two regressions. Since our
objective is to provide an intuitive discussion, we consider a simpli¯ed form (without lags) of the
two regressions as in Fernald (2005).
3.3.1 Stationary hours
When hours are treated as stationary or I(0), the regressions are






In (3.1), the contemporaneous e®ects of ²NT
t shocks in°uence ¢lpt through nt. To impose the
restriction that ²NT
t shocks do not a®ect productivity in the long run, hours are speci¯ed in di®er-
ences (see, Shapiro and Watson (1988) for details). Since ²T
t might a®ect the current hours growth,
(3.1) is estimated with instrument variable method, using nt¡1 as an instrument. The residuals
from (3.1), ^ ²t
T, are the estimated technology shocks. These shock enter (3.2) in order to achieve
orthogonality between the technology and non-technology shocks. Using ^ ²t
T, we can estimate (3.2)
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13In the UK data, n0
t¢nt is positive. Moreover, ¢lp0
tnt¡1 and ¢n0
tnt¡1 are both negative, consistent
with the positive impact of non-technology shock on productivity discussed in Section 3.1. The
sign of these covariances implies that the second term on the right hand side of (3.5) is positive.
The ¯rst covariance term, n0
t¢lpt, is negative in the data. The estimated impact of a positive
technology shock on hours is, therefore, negative. By contrast, Fernald (2005) ¯nds that both
covariances terms, n0
t¢lpt and n0
t¡1¢lpt are positive in the U.S. data when the low-frequency
correlation between productivity growth and hours is not taken into account, leading to a positive
response of hours.
3.3.2 Unit root in hours
When hours are treated as having a unit root or I(1), hours enter (3.1) in double di®erences. That
is,
¢lpt = ®¢2nt + ²T
t (3.6)
Using ¢nt¡1 as instrument, we can estimate (3.6). The equation corresponding to (3.5) is
^ ²t
T0
¢nt = (¢lpt ¡ ^ ®¢2¢nt)
0
nt = ¢lp0















t¢nt is negative in the U.K. data. The negative covariance is consistent with
the large negative correlation between labour productivity growth and hours growth (Table 1).
Moreover, the covariances ¢n0
t¡1¢lpt and ¢n0
t¡1¢2nt are negative and ¢2n0
t¢nt is positive. The
overall e®ect of technology shock on hours is, therefore, negative.
3.4 Investment-speci¯c technology shocks
The technology shocks identi¯ed above using the methodology described in Section 2 are neutral
technology shocks. These shocks a®ect the production of all goods in the same way. Greenwood
et al. (1997) and Greenwood et al. (2000), however, stress the importance of investment-speci¯c
technical change (as embodied only in new investment goods) relative to neutral technical change
as a major source of economic growth. A shock to investment-speci¯c technology a®ects the rate
of transformation of current consumption into future productive capital. They point to the secular
decline in the relative price of investment and a simultaneous increase in the relative production
of investment goods in the post-war US data as indicative of investment-speci¯c technical change.
14Building of that framework, Fisher (2005) considers the empirical importance of investment-speci¯c
technology shocks (I-shocks) for US business cycles. A business cycle model with I-shocks predicts
that hours and output should rise after a positive I-shock, similar to the responses of these variables
to an N-shock. Fisher (2005) ¯nds the estimated responses to be consistent with the predicted ones,
and that such shocks are relatively more important than neutral technology shocks (N-shocks) as
they account for a large proportion of the business cycle e®ects of technology shocks. Figure 9
shows the relative price of business investment (ratio of business investment de°ator to the GDP
de°ator) in the UK. There is a downward trend since the late 1970s, and a sharp decline since the
mid-1980s. Over the sample entire period, the relative price has declined, on average, by 55%. At
the same time there has been an increase in the quantity of investment goods produced in the UK
economy. These movements are similar to those in the US and suggest that I-shocks may also be
important for UK business cycles.
Fisher (2005) uses two long run restrictions to identify the N- and the I-shocks. First, only
shocks to investment-speci¯c technology a®ect the relative price of investment in the long run.
Second, only shocks to neutral or investment-speci¯c technology a®ect labour productivity in the
long-run. We consider the same methodology and identify the I- and the N-shocks for the UK using
long-run identi¯cation.21 The VAR speci¯cation (2.2) now includes the relative price of business
investment. As noted in Fisher (2005), constructing a relative price of investment is challenging
given the measurement problems with investment de°ators, particularly those related to quality
adjustments. We expect similar problems would arise in constructing the business investment
de°ator for the UK. To mitigate this problem we also consider an ICT de°ator constructed by the
Bank of England, which incorporates some quality adjustments. Moreover, the relative price of
ICT has declined on average 345% over the sample period, a substantially larger decline than the
relative price of business investment. We, therefore, consider the ICT de°ator to be in line with
the views of Greenwood et al. (1997).
Figure 10 shows the responses to both I- and N-shocks identi¯ed from a three-variable VAR.
The responses of labour productivity, hours, and output to N-shocks are consistent with those in
Figure 5. There is a statistically signi¯cant decline in hours after an N-shock. By contrast, in
21Here we do not impose an additional cross-equation restriction implied by the two identifying assumptions
as discussed in Fisher (2005). The results from medium-run identi¯cation are qualitatively similar. Balleer
(2004) investigates implications of medium-run identi¯cation to Fisher (2002) model using US data.
15response to I-shocks, hours rise in a persistent hump-shaped manner. This response is statistically
signi¯cant. Output also rises and exhibits a hump-shaped response, and is marginally signi¯cant
over ¯ve to twelve quarters. Productivity, on the other hand, shows a persistent, and statistically
signi¯cant, decline. Figure 11 shows the responses when we consider the ICT de°ator instead of
the business investment de°ator to measure the relative price of investment. The main di®erence
with respect to Figure 10 is that the response of output is statistically signi¯cant. The increase in
output and hours upon impact is consistent with the prediction of a real business cycle model with
such shocks. Table 4B presents the correlation between hours and output conditional on I-shocks.
This correlation is large and positive similar to that in the data. The responses are also consistent
with Fisher (2005)'s ¯ndings for the US for the sample period 1955 Q1 to 2000 Q4. The persistent
decline in labour productivity after an I-shock is, however, stronger in the UK relative to the US.
After an I-shock, labour productivity remains negative even after ten years. This appears to be
inconsistent with theoretical response of labour productivity to I-shock where labour productivity
initially falls, and then recovers slowly.
To check whether the estimated labour productivity response is sensitive to I-shocks identi¯ed
from larger VARs we consider the additional variables as in Section 3.2. In the larger VAR, with
nominal consumption-to-output and nominal investment-to-output ratios, labour productivity still
appears to decline in a persistent manner. This response is statistically signi¯cant after ten quarters
(Figure 12). As in the 3-variable VAR, hours rise. The response of output, however, is muted along
with the responses of consumption and investment.
As Fernald (2005) cautions, breaks in the data can be a source of low-frequency correlations
and substantially a®ect short-run estimated responses. Although we do not ¯nd a break in labour
productivity, we do detect a statistically signi¯cant break in the mean of nominal investment-output
ratio in 1991 Q3 (a decline in the mean in the post 1991 sample). We use the exponential F-test
of Andrews and Ploberger (1994) to test for a break in the mean of the series. The value for the
F-statistic for a break in the mean of I=Y equals 59.60 with a bootstrapped p-value of 0.15.22 It
is possible that the break identi¯ed in the I=Y ratio in the UK data may bias the responses to
I-shocks in the larger VAR. We allow for this break and examine the responses. The low frequency
correlation that matters in this case obtains between hours and the investment share. We ¯nd that
22Bootstrapped values are based on Diebold and Chen (1996).
16the responses of investment and hours are the most sensitive when we identify I-shocks using the
ICT de°ator.23
Figure 13 shows that the estimated response of investment to an I-shock is negative (dotted line)
when one does not allow for the break and uses long run identi¯cation. In contrast the response of
investment is strongly positive (solid line) with a break and long run identi¯cation or with medium
run restrictions (12-20 quarters and no break in I=Y imposed).24 Moreover, in the larger VAR the
responses of hours and labour productivity are sensitive to the investment de°ators (Figure 14).25
In the larger VAR, investment rises strongly in response to the I-shock. This is consistent with the
theoretical response of investment to an I-shock. The hours response is, however, muted for the
business investment de°ator and signi¯cant only after ¯ve years, whereas it continues to display a
statistically signi¯cant hump shape for ten quarters for the ICT de°ator (Figures 14 and 15). The
point estimates of labour productivity indicate a persistent decline. However, for the ICT de°ator
we ¯nd that the response of productivity is similar to that in Fisher (2005). Productivity starts to
recover after ten quarters, and is close to zero after eight years.
Interestingly, as it turns out, both the recommendations of Erceg et al. (2005) and Christiano
et al. (2005) to include nominal consumption-to-output and nominal investment-to-output ratios in
the VARs, and the recommendation of Fernald (2005) to allow for breaks appear to be important
in the context of examining the implications of estimated I-shocks for the UK.26
3.5 Discussion: plausibility of alternative models
To summarize, in the UK data hours worked decline in response to positive neutral technology
shocks. We considered the important debates in the literature surrounding identi¯cation of tech-
nology shocks, stationarity of labour input, the labour input measures, small and large VAR spec-
i¯cations, and neutral versus investment-speci¯c technology shocks. We found that for the UK,
23Since the end of the last UK recession (1991 Q3) total hours display a pronounced upward trend.
Combined with the downward shift in the mean of the investment share results in a negative correlation that
is re°ected in the estimated responses.
24There is an interesting parallel between this result and the main result in Francis, Owyang and Roush
(2005) which concerns the level vs. di®erence hours debate in the U.S. Francis, Owyang and Roush (2005)
using ¯nite (medium run) restrictions show that the response of hours to a positive (neutral) technology
shock is negative even if hours enter in levels.
25We have also experimented using the US investment price series from Fisher (2005), and the NIPA ICT
investment de°ators (using UK nominal investment shares and the nominal exchange rate). The results were
in both cases qualitatively similar to the ones we obtained using the UK ICT de°ator.
26The response of hours in Section 3.3 is robust to this break in the I=Y ratio.
17the response of hours worked does not change, ie., hours always decline after a (neutral) technol-
ogy shock. The negative covariance (as evident in the large negative correlation) between labour
productivity and hours in the UK data drives this response. The robustness of the response to the
important debates in the literature suggests that the UK economy o®ers an unique perspective on
the debate on the response of hours to estimated technology shocks.
We provide a brief discussion on the plausibility of alternative models for interpreting the
response of hours in the UK data, and more generally for investigating the role of technology
shocks for business cycle issues.
3.5.1 RBC versus sticky-price model
Our results can help assess the plausibility of alternative models for understanding the role of
technology shocks in UK business cycles. The response of hours worked to identi¯ed technology
shocks in the data is not consistent with the standard RBC model which predicts a rise in hours
worked. Prediction of a sticky price model, however, can be consistent with a decline in hours
worked as stressed in Gal¶ ³ (1999). When prices are sticky, a positive technology shock lowers ¯rms'
marginal cost (increases markup), so a given level of demand can be met with reduced number of
hours worked. The reduction in hours would occur even if aggregate demand rises due to monetary
expansion, as long as the increase is proportionally less than the increase in productivity.27
Francis and Ramey (2004), on the other hand show that °exible price models augmented to
include real rigidities such as habit-formation and capital adjustment costs can also rationalize the
decline in hours.28 Given the persistent decline in hours worked in the UK, it is, however, di±cult
to gauge whether real frictions of this sort are particularly strong in the UK economy.29
Another dimension that favours the sticky-price model is the muted response of investment
after a positive (neutral) technology shock. While this response is di±cult to rationalize within an
RBC model, which predicts a strong rise in investment, it can be rationalized within a sticky price
model as discussed in Basu et al. (2005).
27Liu and Phaneuf (2004) show that a sticky wage model, relative to a sticky price model, can better
account for real and nominal wage responses as well to technology shocks.
28See also, for example, Lind¶ e (2004).
29Groth (2005) ¯nds that estimated capital adjustment costs in the UK are broadly similar to those found
for the US in the literature.
183.5.2 Open-economy RBC model with real rigidities
Recently, Collard and Dellas (2004) show that an open economy RBC model in which the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign consumption is su±ciently low can generate a decline
in hours after a technology shock. This model appears to be useful for interpreting the hours
response for two reasons. First, open-economy models are generally regarded as more relevant for
the UK economy and, second, the estimates of trade elasticities for the UK as reported in Hooper
et al. (2005) are quite small (and in the range where the Collard and Dellas (2004) model predicts
a decline in hours). We considered both the real exchange rate and the trade balance (in ¯rst-
di®erences) in the larger VAR of Section 3.2.30 Figures 16 and 17 show the results for the two
cases, respectively. In response to technology shocks, real exchange rate depreciates in a persistent
manner. The response is statistically signi¯cant after a few quarters. Net exports decline and
recover slowly, although the response is not signi¯cant. Qualitatively, these conditional responses
are in line with those in Collard and Dellas (2004).
However, as cautioned by Erceg et al. (2005), the SVAR framework is suitable for discriminating
between models that have su±ciently divergent implications, and in the present context, about how
technology shocks a®ect the labour market. From this perspective, it may be di±cult to distinguish
between sticky price models and the open economy RBC models with imperfect substitutability
between domestic and foreign consumption goods. Both models predict a decline in hours after a
technology shock.
3.5.3 RBC model with investment-speci¯c shocks
Investment-speci¯c technology shocks generate a positive co-movement between hours and output,
and a negative co-movement between productivity and hours. This pattern of conditional correla-
tions does resemble the unconditional correlations between the same variables in the UK data. In
addition, after an I-shock, investment appears to rise.
Overall, we conclude that price stickiness, low substitutability between domestic and foreign
consumption, and investment-speci¯c shocks appear to be the most relevant features in interpreting
and investigating the short-run e®ects of technology shocks on hours, output, and investment. We
now turn to a quantitative evaluation of technology shocks for UK business cycles.
30Trade balance is de¯ned as the value of net UK exports to the world. The real exchange rate is with the
major six trading partners, with an increase denoting an appreciation.
194 Do technology shocks drive UK business cycles?
In this section we assess whether technology shocks (both neutral and investment-speci¯c) are
important drivers of UK business cycles. We examine the role of technology shocks in the variability
of hours and output based on small and large VARs considered in Section 3. We also examine the
contributions of these shocks to the UK business cycle.
4.1 Forecast error decompositions
Table 5 reports the percent of forecast error variance due to technology and non-technology shocks,
at horizons 1, 4, 8, 12, 20, and 50 quarters based on the bivariate VAR (with hours in level).
Technology shocks account for a small fraction of the variance of output until twelve quarters, and
account for a small fraction of the variance of hours at all horizons. For example, they account for
approximately 10% and 15% of the twelve-step-ahead forecast error variance in hours and output,
respectively. By contrast, in the US data, technology shocks account for approximately 45% and
90% of the forecast variance in hours and output at a twelve-quarter horizon (see Christiano et al.
(2003)). In a larger VAR, as shown in Table 6, technology shocks account for a somewhat higher
fraction of the variance in hours and output relative to bivariate VAR. For example, they account for
approximately 17% and 16% of the twelve-step-ahead forecast error variance in hours and output,
respectively.
Table 7 presents the forecast error decompositions for I-shocks and N-shocks. The I-shocks
contribute more to the forecast error variance of hours than the N-shocks over horizons of four to
twenty quarters. The contribution of I-shocks is, however, less than 35%. The N-shocks contribute
relatively more to the forecast error variance of output over horizons of four to twenty quarters.
The contributions of these horizons, however, remain less than 30%. Comparing it with the results
in Fisher (2005) for the US, we ¯nd that the qualitative pattern of contributions of I- and N-
shocks to the forecast error variance of hours and output is similar. However, in quantitative terms
the percent contributions of both shocks are smaller at these horizons. For example, in the US,
I-shocks account for 57% of the variance in hours and 35% of the variance in output at a twelve-
quarter horizon, whereas N-shocks, 14% and 61%, respectively. In the UK, I-shocks account for
approximately 26% of the variance in hours and 13% of the variance in output, whereas N-shocks,
2% and 29%, respectively.
204.2 Contributions to UK business cycles
We examine the relative business cycle variance of variables due to technology shocks. The relative
variance of a variable x is given as V (xv)=V (xd) where V (xv) is the variance of the business cycle
components (HP ¯ltered) of simulated data obtained from the VAR driven only by the estimated
technology shocks and V (xd) is the variance cyclical component of the actual data. This ratio
provides an estimate of the fraction of business cycle variation in a particular variable due to
technology shocks. Table 8 reports the business cycle e®ects when only N-shocks are identi¯ed
using both small and large VARs. The relative variance of output and hours is less than 25%.
Similarly, the relative variance of investment and consumption is even smaller, under 13%.
Table 9 presents the relative business cycle variance of I- and N-shocks. The estimates based on
smaller VAR imply that I-shocks account for 15% of the business cycle variation in hours compared
to N-shocks which account for only 2%. On the other hand, N-shocks account for about 18% of the
variance output compared to the I-shocks which account for about 10%. In the larger VARs (with
either the business investment de°ator or the ICT de°ator based relative price of investment), the
N-shocks appear to account for a relatively higher fraction of business cycle variation in output and
hours than the I-shocks. The I-shocks account for 20% to 30% of the business cycle variability in
investment and about 6% to 10% of the cyclical variability in consumption. These magnitudes for
consumption and investment are higher than those accounted for by the N-shocks.
In comparison with Fisher (2005), we ¯nd that the relative cyclical variances of hours and
output accounted for by N-shocks in the UK are small and similar in magnitude as those in the US
data. The cyclical variances accounted for by I-shocks are, however, substantially smaller compared
to those in the US data.31 Overall, our quantitative results suggest that technology shocks (either
neutral or investment-speci¯c) play a limited role as drivers of UK business cycles.
31Note that we have speci¯ed total hours in levels. In the US data, when total hours (or any other measure
of labour input) enter the VAR in levels, the contribution of I-shock to business cycle variability of output
and hours is the larger than when the labour input enters the VAR in ¯rst-di®erence or is detrended. See,
for example, Gal¶ ³ and Rabanal (2004) Table 3. When we consider ¯rst-di®erence hours for the UK, the
contribution of I-shock to business cycle variability of hours and output is even smaller relative to the level
speci¯cation.
215 Robustness analyses
In this section we conduct a variety of robustness checks and provide corroborative evidence to
establish that the permanent shocks to labour productivity in the UK data identi¯ed as technology
shocks in Section 3 are indeed capturing variations in technology. We also discuss the robustness
of our ¯ndings to sub samples.
5.1 Technology, Solow residuals, and tax rate correlations
We examine correlations between identi¯ed technology shocks and an alternative measure of tech-
nology (the Solow residual), innovations to dividend income tax, and correlations of permanent
shock to productivity across various VAR speci¯cations. Table 10 presents the correlations be-
tween the identi¯ed technology shocks from the VAR systems with (i) the Solow residual, which
is an alternative measure of technology based on a growth-accounting methodology, and (ii) the
UK dividend tax rate as calculated in McGrattan and Prescott (2004). The UK Solow residual is
taken from Groth et al. (2005). It is a private (non farm) sector measure that controls for aggrega-
tion e®ects building up from an industry-based analysis. It uses the capital services measure and
corrects for labour quality.32 The correlation between identi¯ed permanent shocks to labour pro-
ductivity and the Solow residual is relatively large for the quarterly data (approximately 0.5). This
strong correlation between two di®erent measures of technology shock supports the interpretation
of identi¯ed permanent shocks to productivity as technology shocks.33
As discussed in Uhlig (2004), a leading non-technology variable which may potentially in°uence
labour productivity in the long run is the capital income tax rate. Permanent shifts in capital
income tax rate will a®ect the capital-labour ratio and hence labour productivity. To evaluate this
hypothesis we compute correlations in Table 10.34 The correlation with dividend income tax shock
32The measure of Solow residual, however, does not control for variable utilization of inputs and non-
constant returns as in Basu et al. (2005).
33The correlation between the Solow residual constructed in Basu et al. (2005) and the permanent shocks
to productivity, as reported in Gal¶ ³ (2004), is 0.45. As an additional check, using the historical UK data
(1855-2001) from Francis and Ramey (2005) we identify permanent shocks to labour productivity via long-
run restrictions, and compute the corresponding correlations. The correlation between the Solow residual
and technology shock is very strong, 0.88, for the historical data.
34We use the dividend tax rate as computed in McGrattan and Prescott (2004), covering the period 1919
- 2000. We cannot reject the null of a unit root in this series and given no signi¯cant autocorrelation of its
¯rst di®erences, we take the latter as our measure of the tax rate shock. A similar measure is considered in
Gal¶ ³ (2004).
22is negative for permanent shocks identi¯ed from the di®erent VAR speci¯cations in both quarterly
and historical data for the UK.
An additional dimension that we have considered is the possibility that the identi¯ed technology
shocks may be contaminated with labour supply shocks. For example, the estimated responses to
productivity and hours we obtain could be consistent with a contractionary labour supply shock.
To evaluate this hypothesis we have considered a speci¯cation that includes the GDP de°ator as a
measure of the price level. A simple test for evaluating this hypothesis is to examine the response
of the price level following a positive technology shock. The response of the GDP de°ator we
obtain (not shown) shows that the price level declines (signi¯cantly) thus being inconsistent with
the prediction of a contractionary labour supply shock.35 Taken together, the ¯ndings in Table 10
suggest that the identi¯ed shocks do appear to be capturing variations in technology.
5.2 Contemporaneous correlations between identi¯ed shocks
We examine two sets of contemporaneous correlations between identi¯ed shocks. First, shocks
identi¯ed using small and larger VARs. As advocated by Sims (1980) and Faust and Leeper (1997),
checking the consistency of results in this manner is a useful exercise when conducting identi¯cation
of shocks using VARs. Second, shocks identi¯ed using historical UK data and the quarterly UK
data. In the long run data, technology shocks may be the single dominant source of the stochastic
trend in labour productivity. For the UK data, the negative correlation with dividend income tax
documented in Section 5.1 supports this hypothesis. If long-run identi¯cation is most robust for
this (truly) long run dataset then examining correlations of identi¯ed shocks with those from the
(shorter) quarterly data may strengthen the interpretation of shocks in the latter data as technology
shocks.36
35If labour supply shocks are a dominant source of °uctuations in our sample (and thus confounds the
implications drawn) we should obtain an increase in the price level. In contrast to a positive technology
shock a contractionary labour supply shock should also lead to a reduction in output. This prediction on
prices and output obtains under both classes of models we seek to distinguish.
36This rationale derives from discussion in Campbell and Perron (1991) on unit roots which emphasizes the
span of the data as most important for the power of unit root tests rather than the number of observations.
We also used medium-run restrictions on the historical data to back out the most persistent changes in
labour productivity without imposing a unit root and checked the contemporaneous correlation between
these identi¯ed shocks and those under long-run restriction. The correlation between permanent shocks to
labour productivity under both identi¯cation schemes is 1. Moreover, the correlation between permanent
and transitory shocks to productivity is approximately zero. This establishes that both types of restrictions
provide identical answers.
23Table 11 shows the correlations between shocks from small and larger VARs. The correlations
between permanent shocks to labour productivity are high. This is consistent with the results in
Section 4 which show that the responses to technology shocks estimated from small and larger VARs
are similar. Table 12 presents correlations between shocks from the quarterly data and the historical
data (for the same period as the quarterly data 1971 Q1 - 2004 Q4).37 The correlation between
the technology shocks from the historical and those from various VAR speci¯cations estimated on
the quarterly data are large and positive. Moreover, the correlation between the permanent shocks
from the short sample and the transitory (non-technology) shocks (to productivity) in the historical
sample is negative and close to zero. These correlations strengthen the interpretation of shocks in
the quarterly data as technology shocks
5.3 Pre- and post-1992 data
We have shown that the negative correlation (and covariance) between productivity and hours
drives the impulse response of hours to a positive technology shock. One source of the large
unconditional negative correlation between labour productivity and hours documented in Table 1
may be measurement error in the pre-1992 UK labour input data which is interpolated on annual
data. Table 13 reports the business cycle stylized facts for the sub-periods. In the post-1992
data the negative correlation between labour productivity and labour input measures is larger as
compared to that in the pre-1992 data. This suggests that potential measurement error in the pre-
1992 data is not driving the negative correlation in the sample.38 Notice that labour productivity
exhibits less procylicality in the post-1992 data. Its contemporaneous correlation (for the hours
measure) with cyclical output and output growth are 0.14 and 0.36, respectively. In comparison,
the correlations are 0.41 and 0.84, respectively, for the pre-1992 data. These correlations suggests
that UK business cycles may have become somewhat muted since the early 1990s consistent with
¯ndings of Stock and Watson (2002).
37We use the employment measure of labour input since historical data on hours is not available. The
shocks are annualized by averaging the shocks for each year.
38Wen (2004), who also documents a contemporaneous correlation of -0.12 between labour productivity
and employment for the UK over the period 1960 Q1 - 1996 Q4, ¯nds that the negative contemporaneous
correlation arises because productivity leads employment by four quarters in the UK data.
246 Conclusion
In this paper we conducted an extensive investigation of responses of labour input to identi¯ed
neutral and investment-speci¯c technology shocks in the UK. Our main ¯nding is that after a
(positive) neutral technology shock hours worked decline in the UK data. We considered several
important debates in the recent literature, namely, the measures of labour input, stationarity
assumptions, identi¯cation schemes, VAR speci¯cations, and neutral versus investment-speci¯c
technology shocks. The response hours is robust across all of the above considerations. Our
¯nding, therefore, suggests that the UK economy o®ers a unique perspective on the debate on the
response of hours to technology shocks. The large negative correlation between labour productivity
and hours is the source of this negative response of hours. Investment-speci¯c shocks generate a
positive co-movement between hours and output, and raise investment, both consistent with the
data and the theoretical responses. However, these ¯ndings appear to be sensitive across larger
VAR systems and trend breaks. Overall, the ¯ndings suggest that models with price stickiness, low
substitutability between domestic and foreign consumption, and investment-speci¯c shocks appear
to be most plausible in accounting for the short-run e®ects of technology shocks on hours, output,
and investment. Quantitatively, however, technology shocks account for under 20% of the business
cycle variation in hours and under 30% of business cycle variation in output. These ¯ndings suggest
that technology shocks may play only a limited role in driving UK business cycles.
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29Table 1
UK: Key business cycle facts (1971 Q1 - 2004 Q4)
Output Hours Employment Labor prod.
HP ¢ HP ¢ HP ¢ HP ¢
Whole economy measures
Output 1 1
Hours 0.69 0.35 1 1
Labour prod. 0.37 0.80 -0.40 -0.27 1 1
Output 1 1
Employment 0.54 0.34 1 1
Labour prod. 0.70 0.90 -0.22 -0.09 1 1
Private sector measures
Output 1 1
Hours 0.87 0.57 1 1
Labour prod. -0.14 0.35 -0.60 -0.56 1 1
Output 1 1
Employment 0.82 0.59 1 1
Labour prod. 0.30 0.58 -0.30 -0.31 1 1
HP refers to Hodrick-Prescott Filter (¸ = 1600). ¢ indicates ¯rst di®erence.
30Table 2
Stationarity tests: uk labour input measures
Whole economy Private sector
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS
Labor productivity (output per hour) -2.7 -2.5
(0.23) (0.32)
Labor productivity (output per worker) -2.2 -2.72
(0.48) (0.23)
Per capita hours (constant) -2.43 0:70y -4.26 0:08¤
(0.13) (0.001)
Per capita hours (constant+trend) -2.61 0:21y -4.26 0:07¤
(0.27) (0.006)
Total hours(constant) -2.57 0:32¤ -2.41 0:52y
(0.10) (0.14)
Total hours (constant+trend) -2.89 0:18y -4.12 0:09¤
(0.16) (0.009)
Employment (constant+trend) -2.49 0:17y -3.49 0:11¤
(0.32) (0.04)
Per capita Employment (constant) -2.26 0:22¤ -2.87 0:52y
(0.18) (0.05)
ADF and KPSS tests are based on a constant or constant and linear time trend as indicated. Selection of lags in the ADF
test equations are based on SIC criteria. p-values for null of a unit root in parenthesis for ADF test.
¤ (y) indicate that the KPSS test does not reject (rejects) null of stationarity at the 10% level. Hours are
divided by population age 16 and older.
Table 3
UK: Annual Data (1970-2003)
Output Hours Labor prod.
HP ¢ HP ¢ HP ¢
Whole economy measures
Output 1 1
Hours 0.85 0.76 1 1
Labour prod. -0.16 0.06 -0.66 -0.59 1 1
HP refers to Hodrick-Prescott Filter (¸ = 1600). ¢ indicates ¯rst di®erence.
31Table 4A
conditional correlations: between labour productivity (growth)
and labour input
Technology Non technology
Di®erenced hoursy (whole-economy) -0.99 0.09
Di®erenced hoursy (private-sector) -0.99 0.08
Detrended employment* (whole-economy) -0.32 0.53
Detrended employment* (private-sector) -0.29 0.32
y Row 1 corresponds to Figure 3. Row 2 to Figure 4. 2 lags in VAR.
Table 4B
conditional correlations: between business cycle component of output
and hours
Neutral Technology Investment Speci¯c Non technology
Fig.5 -0.43 0.84
Fig.11 -0.60 0.92
y Row 1 corresponds to Figure 5. Row 2 to Figure 11. HP ¯ltered data.
Table 5
forecast error decompositions: technology (t) and non-technology (nt)
shocks
Horizon (quarters)
Variable 1 4 8 12 20 50
T, NT T, NT T, NT T, NT T, NT T, NT
Productivity 74.2, 25.7 80, 20.0 97.2, 2.7 99.2, 0.4 99.6, 3.3 99.1, 0.0
Hours 36.7, 63.3 18.6, 81.3 12.3, 87.7 10.3, 89.6 8.7, 91.2 8.2, 91.7
Output 29.6, 70.3 7.1, 92.8 5.0, 94.9 14.5, 85.4 84.9, 15.0 100, 0
32VAR(4). Hours in level.
Table 6
forecast error decompositions: technology shock
Horizon (quarters)
Variable 1 4 8 12 20 50
Productivity 63.9 83.2 95.6 99.0 98.2 99.1
Hours 42.5 31.3 23.0 16.9 8.8 6.3
Output 0.1 18.1 35.5 16.3 32.0 99.1
In°ation 34.6 42.6 51.7 59.4 66.2 58.2
Real rate 4.9 13.6 12.6 4.0 11.0 11.4
VAR(5). Hours in level.
Table 7
forecast error decompositions: investment specific (is) and neutral (n)
technology shocks
Horizon (quarters)
Variable 1 4 8 12 20 50
IS, N IS, N IS, N IS, N IS, N IS, N
RPI 76.6, 2.7 78.1, 3.1 76.2, 1.4 78.5, 0.8 87.7, 0.3 99.0, 0.0
Productivity 5.3, 74.7 4.5, 81.0 11.0, 87.8 18.0, 81.8 26.7, 70.8 28.1, 71.3
Hours (level) 16.4, 19.8 15.7, 7.0 20.5, 2.8 25.8, 1.8 34.4, 1.1 42.1,1.0
Output 65.5, 33.5 5.3,18.2 12.6, 14.5 13.3, 28.4 0.2, 94.0 27.3, 72.6
VAR(4), 4 lags, RPI=Relative price of total business investment.
table 8: business cycle effects (N shocks)
relative volatility
V (yv)=V (yd) V (hv)=V (hd) V (iv)=V (id) V (cv)=V (cd) V (¼v)=V (¼d) V (rv)=V (rd)
Var(4) 0.14 0.07 - - - -
Var(3) 0.08 0.25 0.10 0.05 - -
Var(5) 0.25 0.22 - - 0.32 0.24
Var(3) 0.22 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.13
N shocks = neutral technology shocks.
33table 9: business cycle effects
relative volatility
Var(4) Var(4)* Var(4)**
IS N IS N IS N
V (yv)=V (yd) 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.12
V (hv)=V (hd) 0.15 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.05 0.37
V (iv)=V (id) - - 0.32 0.04 0.23 0.09
V (cv)=V (cd) - - 0.06 0.01 0.10 0.0
IS= Investment speci¯c. * Total business investment de°ator. ** ICT de°ator.
table 10
correlations
1971 Q1 - 2004 Q4
Tech1 Tech2 Tech3 Tech4
Tax -0.16 -0.42 -0.40 -0.39
Solow resid. 0.58 0.30 0.30 0.42
Historical (Francis and Ramey (2002) dataset)
Tech. Solow resid. Non tech. Taxy
Tech. 1
Solow resid. 0.88 1
Non tech. 0.0 0.16 1
Tax -0.2 0.01 0.09 1
Identi¯ed shocks from VAR(4) historical data, and long-run restriction.
y Tax is ¯rst di®erence of dividend tax rate. Tech1 and Tech2 are identi¯ed
neutral technology shocks obtained from Fisher (2005) VARs in 3 and 5 variables.
Tech3 and Tech4 are identi¯ed neutral technology shocks obtained from
extended type VARs in 4 and 6 variables. Annual averages used for quarterly data.
34table 11
correlations: shocks from small vs. larger vars
Tech1. Tech2. Tech3. Nontech1
Tech1. 1
Tech2. 0.87 1
Tech3. 0.94 0.85 1
Nontech1. 0.008 -0.20 -0.06 1
y Row 1:VAR(4) in productivity, hours (level), long run
Row 2: VAR(3) in productivity, hours (level), I=Y and C=Y ratios, long run.
Row 3: VAR(5) in productivity, hours (level) plus real interest rate and in°ation rate (all quadratic detrended).
Nontech1 is the \other" shock corresponding to Tech1.
Annual averages used.
table 12
correlations: technology shocks from different samples
Historical




y UK historical: VAR(4) in (employment,productivity), quadratic trend removed, long-run ident.
Short sample. Row 1: VAR(3) in productivity, hours(levels) in°ation and real rate (both quadratically. detrended).
plus i/y and c/y ratios. Long-run ident.
Short sample. Row 2: VAR(3) in productivity, hours(levels) plus i/y and c/y ratios. Long-run ident.
Short sample. Row 3: VAR(3) in productivity, employment,plus i/y and c/y ratios. Long-run ident.
Annual averages used for short sample
35Table 13
UK: Key business cycle facts: whole economy measures
Output Hours Employment Labor prod.
HP ¢ HP ¢ HP ¢ HP ¢
Output 1 1
Hours Pre-92 0.69 0.41 1 1
Post-92 0.73 0.03 1 1
Labour prod. Pre-92 0.41 0.84 -0.36 -0.13 1 1
Post-92 0.14 0.36 -0.56 -0.81 1 1
Output 1 1
Employment Pre-92 0.51 0.35 1 1
Post-92 0.71 0.19 1 1
Labour prod. Pre-92 0.72 0.91 -0.21 -0.05 1 1
Post-92 0.55 0.76 -0.19 -0.48 1 1
HP refers to Hodrick-Prescott Filter (¸ = 1600). ¢ indicates ¯rst di®erence.
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38Figure 3: UK: Whole economy, di®erenced total hours, 2 lags in VAR, Technology shocks
(left column), Non-technology shock (right column)



















































































9Figure 4: UK: Private sector, di®erenced hours, 2 lags in VAR, Technology shocks (left
column), Non-technology shock (right column)



















































































0Figure 5: UK: Whole economy, hours in levels, 4 lags in VAR, Technology shocks (left
column), Non-technology shock (right column)















































































1Figure 6: UK: Private sector, level hours, 3 lags in VAR, Technology shocks (left column),
Non-technology shock (right column)



















































































2Figure 7: UK: whole-economy, level hours, four-variable VAR, four lags, medium-run iden-
ti¯cation





































































3Figure 8: UK: whole-economy, level hours, six-variable VAR, four lags, medium-run identi-
¯cation




































































4Figure 9: Relative price (PI=PY) and real share of business investment























45Figure 10: UK: whole economy, 4 lags in VAR, level-hours, long run restrictions,
investment-speci¯c technology shock (left column), neutral technology shock
(right column)



















































































6Figure 11: UK: whole economy, 4 lags in VAR, level-hours, long-run restrictions, ICT de°a-
tor, investment-speci¯c technology shock (left column), neutral technology shock
(right column)





















































































7Figure 12: UK: whole economy, 4 lags in VAR, level-hours, long-run restrictions,
investment-speci¯c technology shock (left column), neutral technology shock (right
column)|business investment de°ator










































































































































8Figure 13: UK: whole economy, 4 lags in VAR, level-hours, long-run restrictions, ICT de°a-
tor. Bias in responses: with (solid) or without (dotted) a break in I=Y ratio





































































































































9Figure 14: UK: whole economy, 4 lags in VAR, level-hours, long-run restrictions, business
investment de°ator, with break in I=Y ratio, investment-speci¯c technology shock (left
column), neutral technology shock (right column)



































































































































0Figure 15: UK: whole economy, 4 lags in VAR, level-hours, long-run restrictions, ICT in-
vestment de°ator, with break in I=Y ratio, investment-speci¯c technology shock (left
column), neutral technology shock (right column)






































































































































1Figure 16: open economy speci¯cation (with real exchange rate): 4 lags in VAR, level-hours,
long-run restrictions, with break in I=Y ratio
















































































2Figure 17: open economy speci¯cation (net exports): 4 lags in VAR, level-hours, long-run
restrictions, with break in I=Y ratio
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